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Case No. 20160500-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, 369 P.3d 103 (Addendum A).
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)
(West Supp. 2016).

INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Miranda v. Arizona required police to warn a person
they are about to question that (1) the person has the right not to talk to
them, and (2) if he does talk to them, anything he says can and will be used
against him in court.

Since then, Miranda warnings have “become so

embedded in routine police practice [that they] have become part of our
national culture.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).

But

despite the universal understanding that anything a person says to police
will be used against him in court, the court of appeals has now held that
many things a person says to police actually cannot be used against him in
court. And this is true, the court of appeals concluded, even when the
statements conflict with the defendant’s trial testimony.
Under Doyle v. Ohio, a person who chooses to exercise his right not to
talk to police cannot have his silence used to impeach his testimony at trial.
According to the court of appeals, silence includes statements about the
interrogation rather than about the crime.
Here, Defendant did not choose to exercise his right not to talk to
police when they tried to question him about a shooting that had happened
only moments before they arrested him. Instead, he demanded to know
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened
him, and professed to be unaware that the shooting had happened. Then at
trial, he admitted that he knew about the shooting, but claimed the victim
was shot accidentally after he pulled his gun in self-defense. The State used
his post-Miranda protestations of ignorance of any shooting at all to impeach
his trial admission to a shooting done while he was acting in self-defense.
The court of appeals held this was error, reasoning that the statements were
the same as silence because, in its estimation, they were statements about
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the interrogation, rather than indisputably admissible statements about the
crime itself. This holding depends on a distinction—actual statements and
silence-equivalent statements—that Doyle itself does not draw. And even
though the court of appeals affirmed on harmlessness grounds, its
reasoning denies the State access to impeachment evidence that no
constitutional rule prohibits using—post-Miranda denials to police that
cannot be squared with an explanation offered at trial.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
This Court granted review on the following question:
“Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the prosecutor
improperly commented on Respondent[’]s failure to assert self-defense
during an interview with police.”
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals’ decision
for correctness. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶6, 358 P.3d 1067.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum C:
 U.S. Const. amend. V
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.1
After a long night of drinking, Defendant shot his friend John. See
R.297:28-29, 132; R.298:7, 36, State’s Ex. 1. John had been visiting his Aunt
Jody and Uncle Tim at their home, where Defendant also rented a room. See
R.297:14-16, 64-65; R.298:31, 36.
John had arrived at their home late one morning for an extended visit.
See R.297:16. When Defendant arrived home later that evening, John and
Tim were playing cribbage. See R.297:18-19, 74. They all “exchanged some
pleasantries” and Defendant sat down with them. R.297:17-19; R.298:40.
Defendant drank beer and John drank whiskey while they visited. See id.
“[A]ll of a sudden,” Defendant got “an attitude” and called Jody a
“cunt.” R.297:19-20, 76, 82, 88. John was “shocked” and told Defendant to
apologize. R.297:20, 82, 89. Tim told Defendant he could not speak that
way to Jody. See R.297:20, 82. But things soon “calmed down” and John
and Tim finished their cribbage game. R.297:21, 83. Afterwards, Tim and
Jody went to bed. R.297:21. John and Defendant stayed up, playing poker
and “taking shots” of whiskey. R.297:21, 78-79.
Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict and conflicting evidence is presented
only as needed to understand the issues raised on appeal. See State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶2, 6 P.3d 1116.
1
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At one point, John and Defendant “got in a little argument over what
[Defendant] had called” Jody. R.297:22. John told Defendant that he had
“disrespect[ed]” his family, but Defendant answered that “it was just how
he felt . . . and he was not going to apologize.” R.297:22, 76-77. The
argument woke Tim, who came out of his bedroom and told them to be
quiet. See R.297:23. John and Defendant “quieted down” and continued to
play poker. Id.
Defendant later invited John into his bedroom for a “shot of brandy.”
R.297:22. They talked about golf as John followed Defendant to his room.
See id. As they reached the foot of Defendant’s bed, John asked if they were
going golfing in the morning. See R.297:23-24. Defendant turned around
and answered, “How about I just fuckin’ kill you?” Id. Defendant had a
gun in his hand. See R.297:24. With his finger on the trigger, Defendant
“[p]ulled back the hammer, raised it up and pointed it in [John’s] face.”
R.297:24. Not wanting “to get shot,” John grabbed Defendant’s wrist with
one hand and “the barrel of the gun” with the other and “tried to pull it
away.” R.297:24, 27. The gun, however, “went off.” R.297:27. The bullet
hit John below his ribcage and exited out his back. See R.297:27-29; State’s
Ex. 1. Fearing that Defendant would shoot him again, John held onto the
gun and Defendant’s wrist while trying to pull the gun free from
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Defendant’s hands. See R.297:29. Defendant fell back onto his bed. See id.
John put one knee on Defendant’s wrist and “screamed for help.” Id.
Awakened by the gunshot, Tim and Jody ran to Defendant’s
bedroom. See R.297:68-69, 80, 90. Tim saw Defendant lying on his bed,
holding a gun with his finger on the trigger. See R.297:69-70. John stood
over Defendant with one foot on the floor and his other knee on
Defendant’s wrist. See R.297:69-70, 80. John was holding the barrel of the
gun with one hand and Defendant’s wrist with the other. See R.297:69-70.
John told his aunt and uncle that he had been shot. See R.297:70, 81,
91. Tim “rushed” Jody “out of the room” and called 911. R.297:71. Soon
after, Tim informed John and Defendant—who were still struggling over
the gun—that the police had arrived and were outside.
R.298:50-51.

See R.297:30;

To persuade Defendant to let go of the gun, John told

Defendant that he would go outside and tell the police that the shooting
was an accident. See R.297:30; R.298:51. Defendant surrendered the gun
and John carried it outside to the waiting police. See R.297:30, 49. An
ambulance took John to the hospital where he was treated and later
released. See R.297:31, 42.
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At the hospital, John told the investigating officer, Detective Arnn,
that Defendant had pointed a gun at him and said something like “I’m just
going to kill you” or “I should kill you now.” R.297:46-47, 117.
Defendant’s police interview: “You woke me up” 2
After John walked outside to the waiting police, Defendant changed
his clothes. See R.298:51. He then walked outside. See R.298:51-52. The
police immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station
for questioning. R.298:54. Once in an interview room, the interviewing
officer, Detective Arnn, observed that Defendant smelled “very strong[ly]”
of alcohol. R.297:131. He offered Defendant a Coke. See R.297:131; R.298:64.
Defendant responded that he wanted “a rum and Coke,” then a “six pack
and a cigarette.”

R.298:64.

And Defendant asked the police officers

whether they thought they could “all handle” him. R.298:54, 63-64.
Defendant told Detective Arnn, “Still don’t understand why I’m here.
What happened?” R.298:64.

When Detective Arnn explained that

Defendant was under arrest, Defendant asked, “for what?” and then asked
repeatedly why he was there. R.298:64-65. In response, Detective Arnn read
Defendant his Miranda rights, but Defendant replied that he did not
A transcript of Defendant’s police interview is not in the record on
appeal. This account is taken from Defendant’s testimony at trial. See
R.298:56, 63-66, 70.
2
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understand his rights. See R.298:65. Detective Arnn asked him what part of
his rights he did not understand and Defendant retorted, “The part where
you’re fucking jerking me off. What the fuck am I doing here to begin with?
You people woke me up.” Id. He continued, “I want to know what the fuck
I am doing here. . . .” Id. Detective Arnn told Defendant that he was under
arrest for attempted murder and Defendant asked, “To who?” R.298:70. In
answer, Detective Arnn explained that someone had been shot.
R.298:65, 70.

See

Defendant responded, “Whose [sic] got a gunshot wound?”

Id. Defendant continued, “I want to know what the fuck is going on . . . .
You woke me up. I want to know what is going on.” R.298:65. Detective
Arnn eventually stopped the interview. See R.297:1.
Defendant’s phone calls from jail:
Changing the “game plan” to self-defense
While in jail awaiting trial, Defendant made several phone calls. He
first called Tim, asking him to tell him “what happened” because Defendant
did not “remember anything” and the police had told him he shot Tim.
R.298:24, 55-56. Later, Defendant called his mother. R.298:58. He told her
that he needed John “to say this was an accident.” Id. A day later, he
assured his mother that John would be a “team player” and “say this was an
accident.” R.298:58:25, 58.
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Defendant later called a friend, Christy. R.298:59, 66-67. When Christy
told Defendant that John was “unwilling to say this was an accident,”
Defendant asked her to “[t]alk to him again,” “be pushy,” and tell him that
they would “take care of him” and make it “well worth his while” if he told
police that the shooting was an accident. Id.
But Defendant later told his mother in another call that he would
“have to change the game plan” and was “[g]oing a different direction with
the story, [it’s] self-defense now since John . . . doesn’t want to play ball.”
R.298:25, 59-60.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with felony discharge of a firearm with

injury, a second degree felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree
felony. See R.46-47.
Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of his police interview
The morning of trial, defense counsel orally moved to exclude
“anything in regard to” Defendant’s police interview. R.297:8, 1. Defense
counsel argued that Defendant had not cooperated in the interview and
“stated numerous times that he didn’t understand his Miranda rights and
finally the State gave up and did not question any further.”

R.297:1.

The State represented that it would not “go into the content” of
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Defendant’s interview, but wanted the detective to testify about
Defendant’s behavior so that the jury could “understand that the defendant
was inebriated” like John. R.297:2, 9. When the trial court stated that
“behavioral descriptions” “should be acceptable,” defense counsel further
objected that Defendant’s “belligerent” attitude was not relevant. R.298:2, 9.
The State clarified that it would ask the officer only “[v]ery general”
questions about Defendant’s intoxication and not “paint the defendant as a
jerk.”

See R.297:10.

The court stated, “I think that addresses [defense

counsel]’s concerns. Is that correct?” R.297:11. Defense counsel answered,
“it will.” Id.
The State’s case
The State called John, Tim, Jody, and Detective Arnn to testify at trial.
See R.297. The State also played excerpts of the jail house phone calls.
R.298:21-26.3 The jury heard that Defendant called Tim, asking him to tell
him “what happened” because Defendant did not “remember anything”
and the police had told him he shot Tim. R.298:55-56. They also heard
Defendant telling his mother that he believed John would be a “team
The phone calls were not transcribed and the recordings were not
transported with the rest of the record on appeal. See supplemental index;
R.135. The prosecutor, however, summarized some portions of the phone
calls on the record and Defendant also testified to what he said in the calls.
See R.298:21-26, 55-60, 66-67.
3
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player” and “say this was an accident.” R.298:58:25, 58. They then heard
Defendant’s ask Christy to talk with John, “be pushy,” and tell him that
they would “take care of him” and make it “well worth his while” if he told
police that the shooting was an accident. R.298:59, 66-67. And finally, they
head Defendant telling his mother that they would “have to change the
game plan” and go “a different direction with the story, [it’s] self-defense
now since John . . . doesn’t want to play ball.” R.298:25, 59-60.
Detective Arnn testified about his interviews with Defendant and
John. See R.297:104-152. True to his word, the prosecutor did not ask
Detective Arnn about the content of Defendant’s interview or about
Defendant’s attitude; he asked only about Defendant’s drunken demeanor.
See R.297:130-132.

And Detective Arnn testified only that Defendant

appeared drunk and that Defendant acted “more inebriated” than John.
R.297:132.
When defense counsel cross-examined Detective Arnn, he asked
whether Defendant was “a little mad,” “[b]elligerent,” and not “very
cooperative” in the interview. R.297:138-139. Detective Arnn answered yes
to each question. Id.
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Defendant’s defense: Self-defense
Defendant testified. See R.298:31-70. He claimed that he had pulled
out his gun in self-defense and that John had pulled the trigger himself
when he grabbed the gun and fell on top of him. See id.
According to Defendant, after he called Jody a “fat fucking cunt,”
John told him to apologize. R.298:43-44. Defendant refused and went to his
room. R.298:44. He claimed that he was sitting on his bed when John came
in uninvited, stepped “on top” of Defendant’s feet, put both of his fists
“up,” and stood “over the top” of Defendant.

R.298:44-45.

Defendant, “you’re going to apologize to my aunt.”

John told

R.298:45.

Feeling

“threatened,” Defendant grabbed his loaded gun from under his pillow,
pointed it at John, and told him, “you need to get out of my room.”
R.298:45-46.
Defendant testified that John, however, grabbed the gun, pinning
Defendant’s finger against the gun frame. See R.298:46. John then lost his
balance, fell on top of Defendant, and John’s finger “pushed the trigger and
fired the weapon.” Id.
After John was shot, Defendant did not let go of the gun for fear that
John would “turn around and use it” on him. R.298:50. But Defendant
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relinquished the weapon when John told him that he would go outside and
tell the waiting police that the shooting was an accident. See R.298:51.
Defendant also gave an explanation for his phone calls from jail. He
asserted that he had lied to Tim about not remembering the shooting simply
because he wanted to “find out what’s going on on his end.” R.298:56. And
he explained that he talked to Christy about compensating John because
Christy had told him that John did not want to “press charges” and “just
wanted to [be] compensated for the days off that he missed from work.”
R.298:59-60.
While explaining his phone call with Tim on direct examination,
Defendant testified that the police had tried to read him his Miranda rights
and ask him what happened, but he told them, “I’m not telling you
anything.”

R.298:56.

His counsel also asked him whether he was

“belligerent” and “uncooperative” at his police interview.

R.298:54, 64.

Defendant agreed that he had been. See id.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor stated that he wanted to “round
off” Defendant’s testimony about being “belligerent” during his police
interview. R.298:63. The prosecutor asked Defendant about his requests for
rum and Coke, a six pack, and cigarettes. R.298:64. He asked Defendant
about his taunting officers with whether they could “all handle” him.
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R.298:54, 63-64. And he asked Defendant whether he demanded to know
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened
him, and professed to be unaware that the shooting happened. R.298:65, 70.
Defendant admitted that he had made all those statements, including “I
want to know what’s going on,” “You people woke me up,” “Whose [sic]
got a gunshot wound?” and “To who?” in response to being informed that
he was under arrest for attempted murder. See R.298:54, 63-65, 70. Defense
counsel did not object to any of the questions. See id.
Defendant called other witnesses to testify on his behalf. His mother
testified that John had told her the shooting was an accident. See R.298:75,
77, 79. Defendant’s mother’s friend testified that she overheard John say the
shooting was an accident over the phone. R.298:76, 80-81. And a physician
testified as an expert that John’s blood alcohol level was high enough to
impair one’s ability “[t]o think, to understand, to remember” and “walk in a
straight line.” R.298:8.
Closing arguments
In closing, the prosecutor explained how the evidence met the
elements of the crimes of discharge of a firearm with injury and aggravated
assault. He also argued that Defendant had not acted in self-defense: “He
brought the gun to what had been a word fight.” R.298:96-97.
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In Defendant’s closing, defense counsel argued that Defendant had
pulled his gun in self-defense and that John “discharged” the gun when he
tried to take it. R.298:107-113. He further argued that the jail house phone
calls were consistent with the defense theory and that Defendant merely
had been willing to compensate John for his lost wages. R.298:112.
Defense counsel also argued that Defendant was “belligerent” and
“uncooperative” at his police interview because he was “an innocent man,”
and that his behavior “cause[d] [Detective Arnn] to be not very pleasant
when he comes to testify.” R.298:111.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that Defendant’s self-defense
theory was not believable because his story had evolved: first, he claimed to
the police and to John’s uncle that he did not know what happened; then he
asked his friend to push John into saying that it was an accident; and when
that did not work, he finally claimed that he acted in self-defense.
R.298:119-120. The prosecutor explained that Defendant told the police in
his interview not that he acted in self-defense, or even that it was an
accident, but that he did not know that anything had happened:
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they
questioned him, what does he say? Why am I here? Why are
you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up.
You woke me up. He didn’t say it was an accident. He doesn’t
say this was self-defense.
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R.298:120.
Defendant immediately objected and moved for a mistrial: “That is a
comment on my client’s right to remain silent and I move for a mistrial.”
R.298:121.

The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was not a

comment on Defendant’s right to remain silent, and even if it were, it did
not influence the jury to Defendant’s prejudice. R.298:123-124, R.178.
The jury ultimately convicted Defendant of aggravated assault, but
found him not guilty of discharge of a firearm with injury. See R.135, 138;
R.298:128.
Defendant timely appealed. R.264.
The court of appeals’ decision
On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the prosecutor’s closing
argument impermissibly used his silence as evidence of guilt, violating his
right against self-incrimination. State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶13, 369
P.3d 103.

The court of appeals agreed, holding that the prosecutor

impermissibly commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to remain
silent when he pointed out in closing argument that Defendant had not told
the police that he acted in self-defense, as he had testified at trial. See id. at
¶26.
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Although the court of appeals recognized that Defendant “did not
remain silent in the usual sense”—for Defendant “in fact made statements
to police”—it nonetheless treated Defendant’s statements as “the equivalent
of silence.” Id. at ¶¶13 n.3, 21-22, 29. This was because the court of appeals
believed that “controlling case law treats commenting on the suspect’s
statements about the interrogation—as opposed to statements about the
crime—as tantamount to commenting on the suspect’s silence.” Id. at ¶13
n.3.
The court of appeals relied on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam). It noted that although
the Doyle decision prohibited the use of a defendant’s post-Miranda
“silence,” two footnotes in the opinion revealed that one of the two
defendants in the case made two statements to police after arrest: either “I
don’t know what you are talking about” or “What’s this all about?” and
“you got to be crazy.” McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶17 (quoting Doyle, 426
U.S. at 614-615 n.5 & 622 n.4 (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
And in Charles, the United States Supreme Court recognized—again
in a footnote—that Doyle “‘analyzed the due process question as if both
defendants had remained silent.’” McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶20 (quoting
Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2).
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Relying on these two footnotes, the court of appeals declined to take
Doyle at its word—that it prohibits using a defendant’s post-Miranda
silence—and concluded that “[w]hat matters,” is not whether the defendant
is silent, but whether his post-Miranda statements are “‘about [a
defendant’s] involvement in the crime.’” Id. (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at
407) (second alteration in original). The court read Charles to hold that postarrest statements about the suspect’s involvement in the interrogation
itself—such as ‘What’s this all about?’ ‘You got to be crazy,’ and ‘I don’t
know what you are talking about’—are for Doyle purposes, the equivalent
of silence.” Id. at ¶21.
Applying this principle, the court of appeals determined that
Defendant’s statements—namely “‘Why are you jerking me [around]?’”
“‘Nothing happened,’” and “‘You woke me up’”—although “more
bellicose,” were similar to those in Doyle and accordingly were statements
about his interrogation, not about the crime.

Id. at ¶22 (addition in

original). The court of appeals thus proceeded “as if [Defendant] had
remained silent” and held that the prosecutor violated the Doyle
proscription when he referred to Defendant’s statements in his closing
argument. Id. at ¶¶22, 26, 29.
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Although the court of appeals found constitutional error, it
nonetheless affirmed Defendant’s conviction because the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence of Defendant’s
evolving

story—independent

of

his

statements

to

police—was

overwhelming, Defendant’s own testimony supported his aggravated
assault conviction, and the prosecutor’s comment was an “isolated
reference”—roughly four lines of transcript. Id. at ¶33-36, 38.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to
remain silent because Defendant’s post-Miranda statements “about his
involvement in the interrogation” were equivalent to silence under Doyle v.
Ohio and Anderson v. Charles. Neither Doyle nor Charles supports treating
Defendant’s statements as the equivalent of silence. First, Doyle and Charles
did not distinguish between a defendant’s statements about the
interrogation and a defendant’s statements about the crime. Rather, the
controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and what it prohibits is
whether the prosecutor’s questions were “designed to draw meaning from
silence,” or “to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.”
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Where the prosecutor elicits an explanation for a prior inconsistent
statement, there is no Doyle violation. That is what the prosecutor did here.
When police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested
his factual innocence by pretending to know nothing about it. By the time
of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the shooting he told
police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally exonerating
explanation for it. The two stories cannot be squared with each other, and
the prosecutor properly informed the jury of the conflict.
But even if Doyle or Charles arguably created a distinction between
statements about the interrogation or statements about the crime, the court
of appeals still erred because Defendant’s statements here were not about
the interrogation.

They were instead statements about the crime that

conflicted with the version he gave at trial. Defendant’s statements told an
exculpatory story that he was not involved in the crime: he had been
asleep, he was awakened by the police, and he did not know that anyone
had been shot. By prohibiting the State from inquiring into statements like
Defendant’s, the court of appeals has denied the jury access to information
important to assessing whether a defendant’s testimony is true. This Court
should reverse.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONESOULY HELD THAT
DEFENDANT’S
INCONSISTENT,
POST-MIRANDA
STATEMENTS WERE EQUIVALENT TO SILENCE UNDER
DOYLE V. OHIO AND ANDERSON V. CHARLES
The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to
remain silent under Doyle v. Ohio.
When a defendant exercises his right not to talk to police, then
testifies to an exculpatory version of events at trial, Doyle v. Ohio and
Anderson v. Charles prohibit the State from arguing that the jury should not
believe the defendant’s testimony on the basis that he withheld that version
from police when he refused to talk to them.
But Defendant did not remain silent after Miranda warnings. Instead,
he told police that he had been asleep at the time of the shooting and did
not know that anyone had been shot. See R.298:63-65, 70. These statements
conflicted with his trial testimony that he was awake and knew that John
had been shot in a struggle that resulted when Defendant merely tried to
defend himself.
Even though the prosecutor did not rely on Defendant’s postMiranda silence, the court of appeals held that the prosecutor
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right to
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remain silent. To get there, the court of appeals recognized a different kind
of post-Miranda “silence”—post-Miranda silence-equivalent statements. It
concluded that post-Miranda statements about the interrogation are the
same as silence and Doyle and Charles prohibited using those statements to
impeach Defendant’s inconsistent trial testimony.
Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support treating
Defendant’s statements as the equivalent of silence. First, Doyle and Charles
did not distinguish between a defendant’s statements about the
interrogation and a defendant’s statements about the crime, or otherwise
characterize statements about the interrogation as the equivalent of silence
that the State may not use. Second, even if Doyle or Charles arguably did so,
the court of appeals still erred because Defendant’s statements here were
not about the interrogation; they were instead statements about the crime
that conflicted with the version he gave at trial. By prohibiting the State
from inquiring into statements like Defendant’s, the court of appeals has
denied the jury access to information important to assessing whether a
defendant’s testimony is true.
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A. Doyle v. Ohio and Anderson v. Charles did not create a
category of silence-equivalent statements that the State
cannot use at trial.
Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support the proposition
that a defendant’s statements are to be treated as silence when they concern
the interrogation and not the crime. Rather, both cases support the longstanding understanding that a prosecutor may impeach a defendant with
his post-Miranda statements that conflict with his trial testimony.
The Fifth Amendment to the Utah States Constitution provides that
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires “a
person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to
be silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he has the
right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation.”
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). Implicit in Miranda’s warning is the
assurance that if a person invokes his right to remain silent, his “silence will
carry no penalty.” Id. at 618. Thus, in Doyle v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court held that “the use for impeachment purposes of [a
defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda
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warnings, violate[s] the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id. at 619.
Doyle based its holding on two grounds.

First, as stated, it was

“fundamentally unfair” to use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence when the
warning implicitly assured him that “silence will carry no penalty.” Id. at
618. Second, silence is not necessarily inconsistent with later trial testimony.
Id. at 617. Indeed, post-Miranda silence is “insolubly ambiguous” because it
“may be nothing more than . . . [an] exercise of these Miranda rights.” Id.
The petitioners in Doyle, Doyle and Wood, had been charged with
selling marijuana to an informant. Id. at 611. They were arrested near the
scene of the transaction and given Miranda warnings by the arresting officer.
Id. at 612. They were tried separately and each testified at both trials that
they were actually attempting to buy marijuana and that the informant had
framed them. Id. at 612-613.
During

cross-examination

of

each

petitioner,

the

prosecutor

repeatedly asked why they had not told the frame-up story to the arresting
officer: if “you are innocent . . . why didn’t you tell him?” Id. at 613-614.
And in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the petitioners’ postarrest silence showed they were guilty: “if you are innocent . . . You tell the
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truth. You tell them what happened. . . .” Id. at 633-634 n.12 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
The Doyle opinion characterized petitioners Doyle and Wood as
remaining silent after arrest. Id. at 613, 616 (framing issue as “use of a
defendant’s post-arrest silence” and quoting cross-examination of Wood
who testified that he did not tell arresting officer anything). But a footnote
in the majority’s opinion shows that one of the petitioners, Doyle, made one
statement at arrest. Id. at 614 n.5. At his trial, Doyle testified that he said
only “‘What’s this all about?’” when arrested. Id. He denied making the
statement, “‘I don’t know what you are talking about.’” Id. A footnote in
the dissenting opinion also shows that at Wood’s trial, Doyle testified that
he made two statements at arrest, “What the hell is all this about” and “you
got to be crazy.” Id. at 622 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Wood remained
silent. See id.; Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1980) (per curiam).
But the Doyle Court never directly acknowledged that Doyle made
one or two statements at arrest. See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610. It did not
consider whether Doyle’s statement(s) were “the equivalent of silence.”
McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶21.

And it did not distinguish between

statements made about an interrogation and statements made about the
facts of the crime. See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610.
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In Anderson v. Charles, the United States Supreme Court made clear
that Doyle does not prohibit a prosecutor from impeaching a defendant with
his post-Miranda statements when they are inconsistent with his trial
testimony.

447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam).

This is true even if the

prosecutor’s questioning “concerned the respondent’s failure to tell the
police the story he recounted at trial.” Id. at 408.
Charles was arrested while driving a stolen car that belonged to a
murder victim. Id. at 404. After receiving Miranda warnings, Charles told
police that he stole the car from a certain street. Id. at 405, 408-409. But at
trial he testified that he stole the car from a parking lot at a location two
miles distant from this street. Id. The prosecutor cross-examined Charles
about this inconsistency, asking him, “Don’t you think it’s rather odd that if
it were the truth that you didn’t come forward and tell anybody at the time
you were arrested, where you got that car?” Id. at 406.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s questioning was not a
Doyle violation. “Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely
inquires into prior inconsistent statements.” Id. at 408. And although the
“two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said to involve ‘silence’
insofar as it omits facts included in the other version . . . Doyle does not
require any such formulistic understanding of ‘silence.’” Id. at 409.
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The Charles court explained that the underpinnings of the Doyle
decision did not apply in that situation. First, “[s]uch questioning makes no
unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to
the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent
at all.” Id. at 408 (citing with approval United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350,
354-356 (3rd Cir. 1979) (en banc) (explaining “Doyle can have no application
to a case in which the defendant did not exercise his right to remain silent”;
for “to hold that a prosecutor may not question or refer to a defendant’s
statements and conduct which were designed to deceive the police
regarding the commission of a crime, we would be extending the holding of
Doyle far beyond its rationale”). Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 (explaining
it is “fundamentally unfair” to use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence when
the warning implicitly assured him that “silence will carry no penalty”).
Second, the questions “were not designed to draw meaning from
silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.”
Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (explaining postMiranda silence is not necessarily inconsistent with trial testimony because it
“may be nothing more than . . . [an] exercise of these Miranda rights”). See
also People v. McReavy, 462 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 1990) (explaining that if
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defendant is silent “there is an irrebuttable presumption of irrelevancy, and
such silence may not be used substantively or for impeachment purposes
since there is no way to know after the fact whether it was due to the
exercise of constitutional rights or to guilty knowledge . . . [but w]here the
defendant has not maintained ‘silence,’ but has chosen to speak, the Court
has refused to endorse a formalistic view of silence”).
In its discussion of Doyle, Charles described the case as one that
“involved two defendants who made no postarrest statements about their
involvement in the crime.” Charles, 447 U.S. at 407. In a footnote, Charles
recognized that Doyle actually made two statements at arrest, but that both
the Doyle majority and dissent “analyzed the due process question as if both
defendants had remained silent.

The issue was said to involve cross-

examination of a person who ‘does remain silent.’” Id. at 407 n.2 (quoting
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Charles did not otherwise
examine or address why Doyle characterized the petitioners as remaining
silent, but observed that “[i]n any event, neither” of Doyle’s statements
“contradicted the defendant’s later trial testimony.” Id.
Like Doyle, Charles did not consider whether Charles’s statements
could be “the equivalent of silence.” McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶21. It also
did not distinguish between statements made about an interrogation and
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statements made about the facts of the crime. See generally, Charles, 447 U.S.
404. And while Charles noted that Doyle did not make any statements about
his “involvement in the crime,” it also observed that Doyle’s statements did
not contradict his trial testimony in any way. Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 & n.2.
In other words, Doyle’s post-Miranda statements were not prior inconsistent
statements that could be used to impeach his trial testimony. See Grunewald
v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418 (1957) (“It is, of course, an elementary rule
of evidence that prior statements may be used to impeach the credibility of
a criminal defendant . . . [b]ut this can be done only if the judge is satisfied
that the prior statements are in fact inconsistent.”); United States v. Hale, 422
U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (“A basic rule of evidence provides that prior
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a
witness.”). See also Reynolds v. State, 114 So.3d 61, 134 (Ala. App. 2010)
(hypothesizing that Doyle’s statements were “construed to be silence for the
purposes of analysis, presumably because it did not actually contradict
Doyle’s trial testimony”) (citing Charles, 447 U.S. at 408 n. 2).
Thus, the controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and
what it prohibits is not whether a defendant’s statements are about his
involvement in the crime or about the interrogations itself, as the court of
appeals declared, McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶20. Rather, the controlling
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distinction is whether the prosecutor’s questions were “designed to draw
meaning from silence,” or “to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent
statement.” Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. See also State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 315
(Utah 1985), abandoned on other grounds as stated in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986), (explaining that to constitute an impermissible comment on a
defendant’s silence, the remark must be “‘manifestly intended or . . . of such
character that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount
to a comment on defendant’s silence’”); United States v. Cantebury, 985 F.2d
483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining Doyle violation “turns on whether the
cross-examination was designed to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony
by calling attention to prior inconsistent statements or, instead, was
designed to suggest an inference of guilt from the defendant’s post-arrest
silence.”); Greico v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[O]nce a
defendant makes post-arrest statements that may arguably be inconsistent
with the trial story, inquiry into what was not said at arrest may be
designed not ‘to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for
a prior inconsistent statement.’”) (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 409); United
States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that there is no
Doyle violation where “differences between the post-arrest statement and
the trial testimony [are] ‘arguably inconsistent’”).
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And where the

prosecutor elicits an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement, there is
no Doyle violation. Charles, 447 U.S. at 408-409. See also State v. Velarde, 675
P.2d 1194, 1195 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (“The inconsistency of that
testimony with what defendant had told the officer is a legitimate basis for a
prosecutor’s testing the credibility of a witness by way of impeachment.”).
Here, there can be no doubt that the prosecutor did only what Doyle
permits: confront Defendant with his prior inconsistent statements. When
police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested his factual
innocence by pretending to know nothing about it. See R.298:63-35, 70. As
time showed him that that strategy would likely fail, he changed course. By
the time of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the
shooting he told police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally
exonerating explanation for it. See R.298:44-46. The two stories cannot be
squared with each other, and the prosecutor properly informed the jury of
the conflict:
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they
questioned him, what does he say? Why am I here? Why are
you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up.
You woke me up. He didn’t say it was an accident. He doesn’t
say this was self-defense [like he did at trial].
R.298:120.
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The prosecutor’s cross-examination and closing argument were thus
not designed to suggest that Defendant was guilty because he was silent at
arrest. Rather, the prosecutor’s argument was designed, like in Charles, “to
elicit an explanation” for his inconsistent stories. Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. By
pointing out that Defendant’s story had “evolved,” the prosecutor made no
use of Defendant’s silence. R.298:120.
Likewise, the two bases of the Doyle decision do not apply here. First,
the prosecutor’s argument made “no unfair use of silence because a
defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not
been induced to remain silent.” Charles, 447 U.S. at 408. “As to the subject
matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.” Id.
Second, Defendant’s statements were not “insolubly ambiguous”; they were
patently inconsistent with his trial version of events. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
See also State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1097–98, 1100 (Conn. 2010) (explaining
that “Once an arrestee has waived his right to remain silent, the Doyle
rationale is not operative because the arrestee has not remained silent and
an explanatory statement assuredly is no longer ‘insolubly ambiguous.’ By
speaking, the defendant has chosen unambiguously not to assert his right to
remain silent. He knows that anything he says can and will be used against
him”).
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Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ reading, neither Doyle nor
Charles understood that the silence that the State cannot inquire into
includes statements about the interrogation. They only prohibit drawing an
unfair inference from the defendant’s exercise of a right he has just been
informed he has the right to exercise. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787788 (Utah App. 1991) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor pointed
out that Harrison did not tell police that murder victim was armed like he
did at trial when claiming self-defense); Velarde, 675 P.2d at 1195-1196
(holding that prosecutor properly impeached Velarde’s trial testimony that
he remembered how he arrived in Morgan with statement to police that he
did not know he was in Morgan); United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d
1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor’s questions about details
defendant omitted in interrogation not Doyle violation because prosecutor
was not “attempting to draw meaning from the defendant’s silence”);
United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no Doyle
violation where prosecutor argued in closing that “[n]ever once did” May
tell the story that he told at trial because “focus of the prosecutor’s
comments was not on May’s failure to present his exculpatory story at the
time of arrest, but on prior inconsistent stories as in Anderson v. Charles”);
Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that cross-
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examination “was within permissible limits because [defendant] presented
a new story at trial that was materially different from the information he
provided police”).
The court of appeals’ classification of statements about the
interrogation as opposed to statements about the crime is problematic for
other reasons as well. In most cases, a defendant’s statements about his
interrogation would likely not be admissible at trial simply because they
would not be relevant.

But there may be cases where a defendant’s

statements—although not about the crime—would be relevant and
necessary at trial.

For example, where a defendant raised an insanity

defense, but he coherently speaks during the interrogation, his statements
could be used at trial to rebut his defense. See Commonwealth v. Hunsberger,
565 A.2d 152, 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle violation where State
introduced defendant’s questions, “Are public defenders as good as money
lawyers?” and “How can I get to see the public defender on the sixth floor
of the courthouse if I am in jail?” to rebut insanity defense). And where a
defendant is charged with DUI, his statements about the interrogation could
be relevant to show his intoxication. See State v. Lee, 967 A.2d 1161, 11641166 (Vt. 2008) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor showed Lee’s
police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities while officer read
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Miranda rights, then was silent; “The State did not offer the tape to show
defendant was guilty because he refused to speak with the officer.”).
Likewise, where a defendant raises an intoxication defense, his statements
about the interrogation would be relevant to rebut his defense. See Shaw v.
State, 2014 WL 3559389, **24, 26 (Ala. App. 2014), petition for certiorari
docketed by Aubrey Shaw v. Alabama, U.S. Aug. 26, 2016 (holding that there
was no Doyle violation where prosecutor introduced Shaw’s post-Miranda
statements that “turn[ed] around all of the questions on the officers” like
“No need to waste y’all’s time,” “What’s age got to do with it anyway?” and
“We’re talking” because they rebutted his intoxication defense).
But under the court of appeals’ decision, in each of these cases, the
State would be constitutionally prohibited from presenting the defendant’s
statements simply because the statements were about the interrogation and
not about the facts of the case. This is not what Doyle intended. See State v.
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997) (explaining defendant has “‘no
right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without
laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts’”).
Indeed, the State is aware of no other jurisdiction that has treated a
defendant’s statements about his interrogation as the equivalent of silence
under Doyle or Charles, and the court of appeals cited none. Rather, many
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courts have found no Doyle violation where the prosecutor impeached a
defendant with statements that were not about his involvement in the
crime. See Hunsberger, 565 A.2d at 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle
violation where State introduced defendant’s questions, “Are public
defenders as good as money lawyers?” and “How can I get to see the public
defender on the sixth floor of the courthouse if I am in jail?”); Lee, 967 A.2d
at 1164-1166 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where prosecutor
showed Lee’s police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities); Shaw,
2014 WL 3559389, *24, 26 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where
prosecutor introduced Shaw’s post-Miranda statements like “No need to
waste y’all’s time,” “What’s age got to do with it anyway?” and “We’re
talking”); Boyd, 992 A.2d at 1100 (finding no Doyle violation where Boyd
told police that he “he was not yet ready to tell the police everything that he
knew about the murder and that he was not willing to discuss the crime
scene”); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1412-1413 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding
no Doyle violation where prosecutor impeached defendant’s trial version
with his statements to police that he was not guilty, he wanted protective
custody, and wanted to take a polygraph test).
The court of appeals thus erred when it treated Defendant’s
statements as the “equivalent of silence.” McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶20.
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“Because the impeachment evidence here concerned Defendant’s statement
. . . Doyle’s rule does not apply.” United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1127
(9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). “A contrary rule ‘would pervert the
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the embarrassment of
impeachment evidence from the defendant’s own mouth.’”
(quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975)).

Id. at 1128

This Court should

reverse.
B.

Defendant’s statements were not about his interrogation; they
were about the crime because they amounted to a denial of
his involvement.
Even if the court of appeals’ disparate treatment of statements about

interrogations versus statements about crimes were supportable, the court
of appeals also erred when it held that Defendant’s statements were not
about the crime. And that error sets precedent for cases where defendants
make statements similar to Defendant’s.
While some of Defendant’s statements bare superficial similarities to
Doyle’s, Defendant did not merely inquire into what was happening, like
Doyle did. Defendant’s statements instead told an exculpatory story that he
was not involved in the crime: he had been asleep, he was awakened by the
police, and he did not know that anyone had been shot.
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Context matters. True, if a defendant had been awakened by police
days or months after a shooting, such a statement might not be about the
facts of the crime. But that is not what happened here. Police arrived
almost immediately after Defendant shot John—indeed, Defendant and
John were still struggling over the gun. See R.297:30; R.298:50-51. They
immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station for
questioning. See R.298:51-54. Thus, Defendant’s statements that the police
had just awakened him and that he wanted to know what was going on
were necessarily statements about the crime, not the interrogation. And by
equating Defendant’s statements to the ones Doyle gave without accounting
for this context, the court of appeals’ decision will allow defendants to give
conflicting accounts of their involvement in a crime without letting the jury
know about the conflict so long as the statements to police bare some
superficial similarity to Doyle’s.
But Doyle and Charles do not give defendants the right to hide postMiranda stories to police that contradict the stories they tell at trial. Quite
the opposite. And to separate the permitted from the prohibited, the “court
must look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the
context of the disclosure.” State v. Maas, 1999 UT App 325, ¶21, 991 P.2d
1108.

Indeed, it is “the prosecution’s duty to clear up discrepancies
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manufactured by the defendant. . . .” State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 376 (Utah
1982) (per curiam) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor asked
defendant whether he told police the story he told at trial after defendant
testified that he had not had an opportunity to give his version of events).
“There is nothing irregular about trying to straighten out something out on
the record, if a prosecutor is confronted with a voluntary statement of an
accused who has taken the witness stand . . . by asking questions to test the
credibility of the witness.” Id. at 375. Because McCallie allows defendants to
give conflicting accounts without being answerable to explain the
discrepancies—and improperly skews the truth-finding process by doing
so—this Court should reverse and make clear that alleged Doyle violations
must be considered in the context of each case and not a rule that looks only
to superficial similarities between statements made by different defendants
in different contexts.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
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